Causes and consequences of muslim radicalization in Cameroon

Abstract

The problem of religious freedom in the legal and political culture of the West is most often discussed in relation to concepts of human rights and civil liberties, which are associated with a liberal, democratic, pluralist and secular culture. This discourse refers to peaceful coexistence, individual dignity and intercultural and interreligious dialogue, and is expressed in the language of the modern liberal state. Islam takes a different view, referring primarily to its religious sources. Starting from them, it evaluates all manifestations of individual and social life, as well as economic life. Aiming to change those aspects of social and economic life that are negative, it invokes the very sources whose interpretation formally ended in the ninth century, but in its extreme practice continues virtually to this day. Therefore, the nascent ideas of reforming Islam in the late 18th and early 19th centuries preached a return to its (ideal) sources – the thought and life of the “ancestors” (salaf) in the faith, that is, the first Muslim community. Also, later reformist currents – including the fundamentalist movements that emerged from them in the mid-20th century – referred to this primordial bond of secular affairs and religious matters expressed in the Qur’an and Sunnah, treating with hostility the “reigning” elements of Western (European) culture, especially relativistic ethics and the state’s indifference to religion. This is the case in modern Cameroon, where Salafi-Wahhabi movements are developing. The most dangerous of these – the so-called Boko Haram from the northern part of the country – invoke the principle of takfir – the expulsion from the community of believing Muslims – which is widespread in neighboring Nigeria, as nowhere else in the Muslim world. It empowers Boko Haram to wage jihad against other Muslims as well.